According to the United Nations, the illicit drug trade generates
as much as $400 billion in trade annually. That¡¯s $400 billion
any terrorist group with a militant agenda and the willingness
to break the law can tap into. The drug war itself binds the
drug-terror link. Afghanistan¡¯s Taliban profited from the
opium trade because of drug prohibition, not in spite of it.
Just as liquor bootleggers waged deadly turf battles during
alcohol prohibition, the various armed factions waging civil
war in Colombia are all financially dependent on the U.S.
drug war.
To
what extent do terrorists rely on drug trafficking to finance
their activities?
There
is evidence that various terrorist and separatist groups profits
from illicit drug trafficking. The Shining Path, a communist
insurgency group that waged a civil war in Peru during the
1980¡¯s and mid-1990¡¯s, taxed local coca cultivation to fund
their military operations. In Colombia, both the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (ELN) tax illicit drug production as a means of financing
guerilla activities. FARC is the oldest communist guerilla
group in the Western hemisphere; they relied primarily on
kidnapping as a revenue source for decades. It wasn¡¯t until
a crackdown on coca cultivation in Peru during the early 90¡¯s
that production shifted to Southern Colombia. The balloon
effect dramatically increased FARC¡¯s funding base and helped
finance an aggressive military campaign that led to FARC¡¯s
control of an autonomous zone roughly the size of Switzerland.
The
United Self-Defense Forces (AUS), the paramilitary forces
who comprise the front line in the fight against Colombia¡¯s
communist guerilla movement, also benefit financially from
the drug trade. On a smaller scale, Basque separatist terrorists
in Spain and North Ireland¡¯s Irish Republican Army are reported
to have dabbled in drug trafficking. With the exception of
communist guerilla movements in South America, kidnapping,
donations from sympathizers, and financial aid from rogue
governments appears to account for the majority of terrorist
funding.
How
did the Taliban profit from Afghanistan¡¯s opium crop?
Afghanistan
is the world¡¯s largest opium producer. According to the U.S.
Department of State¡¯s 2000 Narcotics Control Report, the
country accounts for 72% of the world¡¯s illicit opium supply,
the majority of which is consumed in Europe. The report contends
that both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance (the main
rival of the Taliban regime and U.S. allies in the war in
Afghanistan) controlled territory used by opium farmers and
drug traffickers. Per the State Department ¡°neither the Taliban
or the Northern Alliance has taken any significant action
to seize stored opium, precursor chemicals or arrest and prosecute
narcotics traffickers. On the contrary, authorities continue
to tax the opium crop at about ten percent, and allow it to
be sold in open bazaars, traded and transported.¡± The State
Department notes that the Taliban promoted opium cultivation
to finance arms purchases and military operations.
Is
drug legalization a viable means of undermining terrorism?
Because
terrorists are not traditional organized crime syndicates
whose sole purpose is to reap inflated illicit market profits,
terrorist activities would likely continue in the event of
drug legalization. Legalizing cocaine would severely limit
the fundraising of the various armed factions waging civil
war in Colombia, but it would not likely end the communist
insurgency, which sustained itself through kidnapping long
before a crackdown in neighboring Peru led to increased Colombian
coca production. The levels of violence would significantly
diminish as violent turf battles over coca growing areas became
a thing of the past, but the insurgents motivated by ideology
instead of greed would likely continue their struggle. Across
the board legalization would also significantly undermine
the funding of Afghanistan¡¯s warlords and any remnants of
the Taliban regime. However, over-the-counter heroin sales
is neither politically viable nor necessary as a means of
combating terrorism. Afghan heroin is primarily consumed in
Europe, a continent already experimenting with harm reduction
alternatives to the drug war, alternatives with previously
unforeseen implications.
Switzerland¡¯s
heroin maintenance trials, which are modeled after methadone
maintenance programs, have shown such promise at reducing
drug-related disease, death and crime that they are being
replicated in Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands. Providing
chronic addicts with standardized doses in a treatment setting
has been shown to eliminate much of the public health problems
associated with illicit market heroin use. Addicts would not
be sharing needles if not for zero tolerance laws that restrict
access to clean syringes, nor would they be committing crimes
to support their habits if not for artificially inflated illicit
market prices. If expanded, prescription heroin maintenance
would ultimately deprive organized crime of its core client
base. This would render illegal heroin trafficking unprofitable,
spare future generations addiction, and significantly undermine
the Taliban¡¯s funding. Middle ground approaches to drug policy
have the potential to reduce the perils of both legalization
and drug prohibition.
While
legalizing heroin is not a practical option, there is a strong
case to be made for regulating the sale of marijuana. Naive
viewers of the Bush administration¡¯s drug-terror ads might
mistakenly conclude that marijuana smokers are somehow responsible
for September 11th. Marijuana, while not harmless, is arguably
safer than many legal drugs. Unlike alcohol, pot has never
been shown to cause an overdose death, nor does it share the
addictive properties of nicotine. However, taxing and regulating
the sale of marijuana to adults would render the drug war
obsolete. As long as marijuana remains illegal and distributed
by organized crime, consumers will continue to come into contact
with hard drugs like cocaine and heroin, drugs that really
do finance terrorism.
Will
an intensification of the war on drugs help win the war against
terrorism?
Attempts
to limit the supply of illegal drugs while demand remains
constant have the effect of actually increasing the profitability
of drug trafficking. An intensification of the drug war in
South America has only increased the level of violence by
increasing the funding base of Colombia¡¯s combatants. In
terms of the domestic drug war, a redoubled effort to incarcerate
ever more U.S. citizens for drug offenses would divert scarce
resources from the war on terrorism. It costs roughly $25,000
a year to imprison a drug offender. Any increase in what is
already the highest incarceration rate in the world would
have no real impact on the ability of terrorists to profit
from the drug war¡¯s distortion of supply and demand dynamics.
The illicit drug of choice in the U.S. is domestically grown
marijuana, not Colombian cocaine or heroin produced in Afghanistan
and destined for Europe¡¯s illicit drug market.
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