Overview
UNGASS
Drug Trafficking & Interdiction
Environmental Consequences

Terrorism


According to the United Nations, the illicit drug trade generates as much as $400 billion in trade annually. That¡¯s $400 billion any terrorist group with a militant agenda and the willingness to break the law can tap into. The drug war itself binds the drug-terror link. Afghanistan¡¯s Taliban profited from the opium trade because of drug prohibition, not in spite of it. Just as liquor bootleggers waged deadly turf battles during alcohol prohibition, the various armed factions waging civil war in Colombia are all financially dependent on the U.S. drug war.

To what extent do terrorists rely on drug trafficking to finance their activities?

There is evidence that various terrorist and separatist groups profits from illicit drug trafficking. The Shining Path, a communist insurgency group that waged a civil war in Peru during the 1980¡¯s and mid-1990¡¯s, taxed local coca cultivation to fund their military operations. In Colombia, both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) tax illicit drug production as a means of financing guerilla activities. FARC is the oldest communist guerilla group in the Western hemisphere; they relied primarily on kidnapping as a revenue source for decades. It wasn¡¯t until a crackdown on coca cultivation in Peru during the early 90¡¯s that production shifted to Southern Colombia. The balloon effect dramatically increased FARC¡¯s funding base and helped finance an aggressive military campaign that led to FARC¡¯s control of an autonomous zone roughly the size of Switzerland.

The United Self-Defense Forces (AUS), the paramilitary forces who comprise the front line in the fight against Colombia¡¯s communist guerilla movement, also benefit financially from the drug trade. On a smaller scale, Basque separatist terrorists in Spain and North Ireland¡¯s Irish Republican Army are reported to have dabbled in drug trafficking. With the exception of communist guerilla movements in South America, kidnapping, donations from sympathizers, and financial aid from rogue governments appears to account for the majority of terrorist funding.

How did the Taliban profit from Afghanistan¡¯s opium crop?

Afghanistan is the world¡¯s largest opium producer. According to the U.S. Department of State¡¯s 2000 Narcotics Control Report, the country accounts for 72% of the world¡¯s illicit opium supply, the majority of which is consumed in Europe. The report contends that both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance (the main rival of the Taliban regime and U.S. allies in the war in Afghanistan) controlled territory used by opium farmers and drug traffickers. Per the State Department ¡°neither the Taliban or the Northern Alliance has taken any significant action to seize stored opium, precursor chemicals or arrest and prosecute narcotics traffickers. On the contrary, authorities continue to tax the opium crop at about ten percent, and allow it to be sold in open bazaars, traded and transported.¡± The State Department notes that the Taliban promoted opium cultivation to finance arms purchases and military operations.

Is drug legalization a viable means of undermining terrorism?

Because terrorists are not traditional organized crime syndicates whose sole purpose is to reap inflated illicit market profits, terrorist activities would likely continue in the event of drug legalization. Legalizing cocaine would severely limit the fundraising of the various armed factions waging civil war in Colombia, but it would not likely end the communist insurgency, which sustained itself through kidnapping long before a crackdown in neighboring Peru led to increased Colombian coca production. The levels of violence would significantly diminish as violent turf battles over coca growing areas became a thing of the past, but the insurgents motivated by ideology instead of greed would likely continue their struggle. Across the board legalization would also significantly undermine the funding of Afghanistan¡¯s warlords and any remnants of the Taliban regime. However, over-the-counter heroin sales is neither politically viable nor necessary as a means of combating terrorism. Afghan heroin is primarily consumed in Europe, a continent already experimenting with harm reduction alternatives to the drug war, alternatives with previously unforeseen implications.

Switzerland¡¯s heroin maintenance trials, which are modeled after methadone maintenance programs, have shown such promise at reducing drug-related disease, death and crime that they are being replicated in Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands. Providing chronic addicts with standardized doses in a treatment setting has been shown to eliminate much of the public health problems associated with illicit market heroin use. Addicts would not be sharing needles if not for zero tolerance laws that restrict access to clean syringes, nor would they be committing crimes to support their habits if not for artificially inflated illicit market prices. If expanded, prescription heroin maintenance would ultimately deprive organized crime of its core client base. This would render illegal heroin trafficking unprofitable, spare future generations addiction, and significantly undermine the Taliban¡¯s funding. Middle ground approaches to drug policy have the potential to reduce the perils of both legalization and drug prohibition.

While legalizing heroin is not a practical option, there is a strong case to be made for regulating the sale of marijuana. Naive viewers of the Bush administration¡¯s drug-terror ads might mistakenly conclude that marijuana smokers are somehow responsible for September 11th. Marijuana, while not harmless, is arguably safer than many legal drugs. Unlike alcohol, pot has never been shown to cause an overdose death, nor does it share the addictive properties of nicotine. However, taxing and regulating the sale of marijuana to adults would render the drug war obsolete. As long as marijuana remains illegal and distributed by organized crime, consumers will continue to come into contact with hard drugs like cocaine and heroin, drugs that really do finance terrorism.

Will an intensification of the war on drugs help win the war against terrorism?

Attempts to limit the supply of illegal drugs while demand remains constant have the effect of actually increasing the profitability of drug trafficking. An intensification of the drug war in South America has only increased the level of violence by increasing the funding base of Colombia¡¯s combatants. In terms of the domestic drug war, a redoubled effort to incarcerate ever more U.S. citizens for drug offenses would divert scarce resources from the war on terrorism. It costs roughly $25,000 a year to imprison a drug offender. Any increase in what is already the highest incarceration rate in the world would have no real impact on the ability of terrorists to profit from the drug war¡¯s distortion of supply and demand dynamics. The illicit drug of choice in the U.S. is domestically grown marijuana, not Colombian cocaine or heroin produced in Afghanistan and destined for Europe¡¯s illicit drug market.